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MASUMURA YuujiGraduate School of Law / Division of Law and Political ScienceAssociate Professor
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■ Paper- Abstract We analyze a model in which shifting power undermines foreign states’ commitments to the status quo, yet domestic leaders cannot credibly communicate the true scale of averted power shifts after preventive war. Publics prefer war only for large prospective power shifts, but preventive war renders the true size of averted shifts unobservable, incentivizing leaders to lie ex post to avoid political punishment. When publics are ex ante skeptical over shift size and war outcomes are middling, the probabilities of war and political punishment, as well as public skepticism over averted shifts and the chances of erroneous punishment, all increase in war outcomes. Public strategies of punishing military failures are particularly unsuccessful at discouraging undesirable preventive wars, yet the same conditions that encourage preventive war undermine its political benefits. We use our model to explain why Japan's leaders failed to convince the public of preventive success against Russia in 1905.Wiley, Apr. 2025, American Journal of Political Science[Refereed]Scientific journal
- Abstract Research on status in international relations has expanded in the last few decades. The key empirical studies suggest that status concern generates an incentive for initiating international conflicts since unilateral military engagement is believed to increase the status of a country. We concur with this argument. However, a further study should be conducted to find whether “multilateral” military engagement can change status perceptions and therefore be related to international politics over status. The test is important since the multilateral use of force is distinct from the unilateral use of force in its theoretical background and its connotation in world politics. In our experiment conducted in Japan, we treat the information on the multilateral use of force, and examine whether variations of the treatment information change people’s self-perception over their country’s international status. The results show that participation in a multilateral use of force increases and an early departure from the multilateral mission out of casualty concerns decreases their country’s self-status perception. Also, we successfully identify that the people who have a high social dominance orientation trait are more susceptible to such information.Oxford University Press (OUP), Jul. 2023, Foreign Policy Analysis, 19(4) (4)[Refereed]Scientific journal
- International Studies Association, Mar. 2025, EnglishArming, Rising, and a Screening Effect of AlliancesOral presentation
- Texas Triangle International Relations Conference, Jan. 2025, EnglishA Theory of Cost-Sharing Negotiations of Military AlliancesOral presentation
- American Political Science Association, Sep. 2024, EnglishA Theory of Cost-Sharing Negotiations of Military AlliancesPoster presentation
- Midwest Political Science Association,, Apr. 2024, EnglishA Constraining Effect of Arms Transfers: Why Do Arms Transfers Deter a Recipient's Aggression?Oral presentation
- American Political Science Association, Sep. 2023, EnglishRules, Power of Chair, and Superpower Control in the UN Security CouncilOral presentation
- International Studies Association, Mar. 2023, EnglishThe Nexus of Power and Rules: How and When does the President affect the Resolutions in the UN Security Council?Oral presentation