Directory of Researchers

ZENNYO Yusuke
Graduate School of Business Administration / Division of Business Administration
Professor
Business / Economics
Last Updated :2024/02/02

Researcher Profile and Settings

Affiliation

  • <Faculty / Graduate School / Others>

    Graduate School of Business Administration / Division of Business Administration
  • <Related Faculty / Graduate School / Others>

    School of Business Administration / Department of Business Administration

Teaching

  • School of Business Administration, 2022, Theory and Practice of Management C
  • School of Business Administration, 2022, Seminar
  • Graduate School of Business Administration, 2022, Studies in Market Analysis (Market Equilibrium and Industrial Organaization)

Research Activities

Research Areas

  • Humanities & social sciences / Commerce
  • Humanities & social sciences / Economic policy

Awards

  • Mar. 2023 電気通信普及財団, 第38回 電気通信普及財団賞 テレコム人文学・社会科学賞, Platform Information Transparency and Effects on Third-Party Suppliers and Offline Retailers

    角田侑史, 善如悠介

  • 2022 神戸大学, 優秀若手研究者賞

    善如悠介

  • Mar. 2015 神戸大学大学院経営学研究科, 伊賀隆賞, Studies on Compatibility and Innovation in Two-sided Markets

    ZENNYO Yusuke

    Others

Published Papers

  • Yuta Kittaka, Susumu Sato, Yusuke Zennyo

    Corresponding, Elsevier BV, Jun. 2023, Japan and the World Economy, 66, 101191 - 101191, English

    [Refereed][Invited]

    Scientific journal

  • Hayama Abe, Yusuke Zennyo

    Abstract This note presents a model of platform competition in a two-sided market, with one competing platform pursuing not only its own profit but also consumer surplus. We investigate how the presence of such a socially conscious platform affects market competition. Results indicate that greater emphasis as an objective put on consumer surplus by the socially conscious platform leads to higher market share. Creation of a larger network enhances the total benefits associated with indirect network externalities in the two-sided market. When the extent of indirect network externalities is sufficiently strong, increased network benefits can improve social welfare. By contrast, if indirect network externalities are weak, then the socially conscious platform might be detrimental to society.

    Corresponding, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Jan. 2023, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 23 (1), 243 - 251, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Yusuke Zennyo

    Wiley, Sep. 2022, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 70 (3), 684 - 710, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Aika Monden, Yusuke Zennyo

    Wiley, 19 Feb. 2022, Managerial and Decision Economics, 43 (7), 3059 - 3071, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Jumpei Hamamura, Yusuke Zennyo

    Springer Science and Business Media LLC, Dec. 2021, Marketing Letters, 32 (4), 379 - 395, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Yushi Tsunoda, Yusuke Zennyo

    Corresponding, Wiley, Nov. 2021, Production and Operations Management, 30 (11), 4219 - 4235, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Aika Monden, Katsuyoshi Takashima, Yusuke Zennyo

    Wiley, Jun. 2021, Real Estate Economics, 49 (2), 556 - 573, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Zhen Li, Katsutoshi Yada, Yusuke Zennyo

    Elsevier BV, Jan. 2021, Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 58 (102277), English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Toshihiro Tsuchihashi, Yusuke Zennyo

    Wiley, Aug. 2020, Managerial and Decision Economics, 42 (1), 209 - 218, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Masayoshi Maruyama, Yusuke Zennyo

    © 2020 Elsevier B.V. This paper examines the effects of platform most-favored-customer (PMFC) clauses on incentives for platforms to invest in demand-enhancing investments that might involve spillover effects. In a bilateral duopoly model incorporating competition between sellers and between platforms, we show that the industry-wide adoption of PMFC clauses raises the platforms’ investment level and the resulting retail price if the substitution between platforms is large compared to the substitution between sellers. Additionally, we assess the respective effects of PMFC clauses on the demand, profit of sellers, profit of platforms, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The results suggest a possible conflict between platforms and competition authorities.

    May 2020, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 70 (102617)

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Freemium Competition Among Ad-Sponsored Platforms

    Yusuke Zennyo

    Lead, Mar. 2020, Information Economics and Policy, 50 (100848), English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Strategic Contracting and Hybrid Use of Agency and Wholesale Contracts in E-Commerce Platforms

    Yusuke Zennyo

    Lead, Feb. 2020, European Journal of Operational Research, 281 (1), 231 - 239, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Jay Pil Choi, Yusuke Zennyo

    This paper develops a framework to analyze platform competition in two‐sided markets in which agents endogenously decide on which side of a platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium pricing structure and perform a comparative statics analysis on how the distribution of agents’ preferences affects the platforms’ profits. We also show that the market equilibrium under pro

    Wiley, Jan. 2019, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 28 (1), 73 - 88, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Masayoshi Maruyama, Yusuke Zennyo

    We analyze a model of cost-reducing R&D and compatibility decisions by two platforms. After an exogenous improvement in the efficiency of R&D, each platform has a heightened incentive to make its software incompatible with the rival's hardware device to avoid being dominated in the hardware market. This can lead to an inefficient market structure. The increase in the efficiency of R&D not only has a positive direct effect of reducing costs through process innovations but also a negative indirect effect through the change of the compatibility decisions. We show that due to this indirect effect, an increased efficiency of R&D can be harmful to the profit of a large platform and harmful to social welfare. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, Sep. 2017, Information Economics and Policy, 40, 1 - 12, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Yoshifumi Hino, Yusuke Zennyo

    We analyze a delegation game relevant to the conduct of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in which the firm’s owner offers the manager a contract consisting of firm profit and social welfare. We derive three results that distinctly differ from existing findings. First, CSR decisions are strategic complements for firms. Second, with simultaneous CSR decisions, the equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost, despite the fact that firms compete in a Cournot duopoly. Finally, with sequential CSR decisions, unlike the follower firm, the leader firm never exhibits CSR. However, the follower firm can enjoy a profit equal to that derived by the leader in a Cournot–Stackelberg game.

    Springer Verlag, 01 Sep. 2017, International Review of Economics, 64 (3), 231 - 244, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Yusuke Zennyo

    We investigate the location choice of two firms whose objectives are the weighted average of their own profit and social welfare, in which they simultaneously decide their locations before setting their prices. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the asymmetric locations are influenced by the asymmetry of the firms’ objectives or by the asymmetry of firms’ marginal costs. We show that, when both firms have the same marginal cost, the equilibrium locations are always symmetric even in the case of the asymmetric objectives. On the other hand, the cost differences lead the asymmetric locations in equilibrium. That is, the asymmetric locations are a result of the cost asymmetry, but not the asymmetry of the firms’ objectives. We also demonstrate that the pursuit of profit by the cost-inefficient firm may increase consumer surplus.

    Springer New York LLC, 01 Mar. 2017, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 17 (1), 29 - 41, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Yusuke Zennyo

    This paper investigates the competition between vertically differentiated platforms in two-sided markets. We assume the presence of two competing platforms producing either higher- or lower-quality devices for consumers. Each platform decides the price of its hardware device for consumers and the royalty rate for software developers. We find that, despite the existence of quality differences, the decisions by the platforms about royalty rates are symmetric and only hardware pricing is asymmetric. We also demonstrate that an equilibrium may exist in which a lower-quality platform can enjoy greater profit than a higher-quality rival when there are higher development costs associated with creating software to meet the needs of higher-quality devices.

    Springer New York LLC, 01 Sep. 2016, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 16 (3), 309 - 321, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Masayoshi Maruyama, David Flath, Kazumitsu Minamikawa, Kenichi Ohkita, Yusuke Zennyo

    This paper analyzes platform selection (affiliation) by game developers in the Japanese home video game industry. We develop an elementary model of affiliation by software developers and propose the hypothesis that wider availability of game titles for a platform positively inclines game developers to affiliate with that platform when releasing new game titles. Then, using data for Japan, we estimate a multinomial logit model that includes both the attributes of game developers and the characteristics of platforms, and find evidence supporting this hypothesis. Overall, the findings suggest that game developers expect the indirect network effect to apply, and the prospect of future growth matters to them when deciding with which platform to affiliate. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE, Dec. 2015, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 38, 282 - 303, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Masayoshi Maruyama, Yusuke Zennyo

    This paper analyzes the unilateral choices of application compatibility by platforms and the endogenous affiliations of two different groups (content providers and users). We find a novel result that for both platforms to unilaterally choose application compatibility is not an equilibrium unless the cost for achieving application compatibility is zero. We also find that asymmetric equilibria exist with regard to other content, where one platform chooses incompatibility while the other platform chooses compatibility and that, these asymmetric equilibria are harmful both to the content providers and to users, compared to the (out-of-equilibrium) outcome where both platforms choose application compatibility. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA, May 2015, Economics Letters, 130, 39 - 42, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Masayoshi Maruyama, Yusuke Zennyo

    We consider a case in which two competing suppliers of hardware devices and content each chooses whether to make its content compatible with the other's device. Our main result is that the outcome of these choices depends upon whether the firms' major source of profit lies in the sale of hardware devices or in royalties from the sale of content. If the hardware is the main source of profit then incompatibility is a dominant strategy. If royalties are the main source of profit then compatibility is the dominant strategy. Which of these situations attains is likely to change over the product life cycle. We add to the literature by showing the equilibrium structure of compatibility in a two-sided market.

    Jun. 2013, Review of Network Economics, 12 (2), 131 - 155, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

  • Masayoshi Maruyama, Kazumitsu Minamikawa, Yusuke Zennyo

    This paper examines the effects of the merger of firms producing complementary components on the quality choice. We extend the model of Economides 1999 to considerably general situations about the quality function, utility function, and distribution function of consumers, and establish the results that a complementary merger provides products of higher quality, and achieves higher market coverage, higher profits and higher consumer surplus than independent ownership. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

    Mar. 2011, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 11 (1), 57 - 65, English

    [Refereed]

    Scientific journal

MISC

Books etc

  • プラットフォームとイノベーションをめぐる新たな競争政策の構築

    根岸哲・泉水文雄・和久井理子

    Contributor, 第15章 プラットフォームによる自己優遇の経済分析, 商事法務, Jul. 2023, ISBN: 9784785730376

  • 経済論文の書き方 = The craft of economic research writing

    経済セミナー編集部

    Contributor, 第14章 応用理論で論文を書く --- 産業組織論のケース, 日本評論社, Sep. 2022, Japanese, ISBN: 9784535540422

Presentations

  • Should Platforms be Held Liable for Defective Third-Party Goods?

    Yusuke Zennyo

    European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, 24 Aug. 2023, English

    Oral presentation

  • Should Platforms be Held Liable for Defective Third-Party Goods?

    Yusuke Zennyo

    Asia-Pacific Industrial Organization Conference, 11 Dec. 2022, English

    Oral presentation

  • Do Agency Contracts Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

    Yusuke Zennyo

    European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, 31 Aug. 2019, English

    Oral presentation

  • Strategic Contracting and Supplier Encroachment Through an E-commerce Platform

    ZENNYO YUSUKE

    Japan Association for Applied Economics, Jun. 2019, English, Nanzan University, This paper considers a supplier’s encroachment strategy through an e-commerce platform. When the supplier sells goods through an online channel in addition to a traditional retailer, he or she should either select a conventional wholesale contract or an emerging agency contract. Under the agency contract, the supplier can directly set its retail price while sales revenues are s, Domestic conference

    Oral presentation

  • Platform Most-Favored-Customer Clauses and Investment Incentives

    ZENNYO YUSUKE

    Asia-Pacific Industrial Organization Conference, Dec. 2018, English, Asia-Pacific Industrial Organization Society, Melbourne, This paper presents examination of the effects of platform most-favored-customer (PMFC) clauses on incentives for platforms to invest in demand-enhancing investments that might involve spillover effects. In a bilateral duopoly model incorporating competition between sellers and between platforms, we show that the presence of PMFC clause raises the platforms’ investment level an, International conference

    Oral presentation

  • Platform Most-Favored-Customer Clauses and Investment Incentives

    ZENNYO Yusuke

    European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), Sep. 2018, Japanese, Athens College, International conference

    Oral presentation

  • Do Agency Contracts Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

    ZENNYO Yusuke

    日本応用経済学会, Jun. 2018, Japanese, 日本応用経済学会, 京都大学, Domestic conference

    Oral presentation

  • Two-sided Platforms

    ZENNYO Yusuke

    日本応用経済学会, Jun. 2017, Japanese, 日本応用経済学会, 久留米大学, Domestic conference

    [Invited]

    Invited oral presentation

  • Freemiums on Advertising Platforms

    ZENNYO Yusuke

    APIOC, Dec. 2016, English, Asia Pacific Industrial Organization Conference, The University of Melbourne, International conference

    Oral presentation

  • Freemium on Advertising Platforms

    EARIE 43rd Annual Conference, 27 Aug. 2016, Japanese, European Economic Association, Lisbon, Portugal, International conference

    Oral presentation

  • Freemiums on Advertising Platforms

    ZENNYO Yusuke

    EARIE, Aug. 2016, English, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, Nova School of Business and Economics, International conference

    Oral presentation

  • Freemium on Advertising Platforms

    ZENNYO Yusuke

    日本応用経済学会 春季大会, Jun. 2016, Japanese, 広島大学, Domestic conference

    Oral presentation

  • Process Innovation in Two-Sided Markets

    Masayoshi Maruyama

    WEAI 90th Annual Conference, 02 Jul. 2015, English, Western Economic Association International, Waikiki, International conference

    Oral presentation

  • Process Innovation in Two-Sided Markets

    ZENNYO Yusuke, Masayoshi Maruyama

    90th Annual Conference, Weastern Economics Association International,, Jul. 2015, English, Waikiki, International conference

    Oral presentation

  • High Profitability of Low-Quality Firm in Two-Sided Markets

    ZENNYO Yusuke

    日本経済学会秋季大会, Oct. 2014, Japanese, 西南学院大学, Domestic conference

    Poster presentation

  • High Profitability of Low-Quality Firm in Two-Sided Markets

    ZENNYO Yusuke

    日本応用経済学会 春季大会, Jun. 2014, Japanese, 徳島大学, Domestic conference

    Oral presentation

  • Welfare Effects of Process Innovation in Two-Sided Markets: The Role of Compatibility Decisions

    ZENNYO Yusuke, MARUYAMA MASAYOSHI

    日本応用経済学会 秋季大会, Nov. 2013, Japanese, 法政大学, Domestic conference

    Oral presentation

  • Compatibility and the Product Life Cycle in Two-Sided Markets

    ZENNYO Yusuke, MARUYAMA MASAYOSHI

    日本経済学会 秋季大会, Oct. 2012, Japanese, 九州産業大学, Domestic conference

    Oral presentation

Research Projects

  • Designing next generation regulations to address multidimensional risks caused by the expansion of digital platforms

    池田 千鶴, 武田 邦宣, 寺田 麻佑, 中川 丈久, 善如 悠介, 行岡 睦彦, 得津 晶, 佐藤 進, 和久井 理子, 川濱 昇, 水野 倫理, 生貝 直人, 川島 富士雄, 井畑 陽平, 水谷 瑛嗣郎, 根岸 哲, 木下 昌彦, 泉水 文雄

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A), Kobe University, Apr. 2022 - Mar. 2027, Coinvestigator

  • プラットフォームビジネスに適合した流通システムの形態に関する研究

    善如 悠介, 丸山 雅祥, 松井 建二, 田頭 拓己, 角田 侑史, 平尾 盛史, 水田 誠一郎

    日本学術振興会, 科学研究費助成事業, 基盤研究(B), 神戸大学, Apr. 2020 - Mar. 2025, Principal investigator

    令和3年度は、プラットフォームの理解を促進するための研究のみならず、それが既存のサプライチェーンへ及ぼす影響の解明の一歩になり得る研究を推進することができた。例えば、前者はプラットフォームが自社の製品を優遇する行為 (自己優遇) に着目したものであり、そのような行為がマーケットプレイス上でのサードパーティの売手の行動や、そこに参加する消費者の行動に与える影響を分析した。さらに、自己優遇行為を禁止するような政策がどのような帰結をもたらしうるかを明らかにすることで、競争政策への貢献を与えた。後者は、プラットフォームが自身の持つ需要情報をサードパーティの売手に共有するか否かを論じたものである。需要情報の共有は、売手のプラットフォーム内での行動だけでなく、既存のサプライチェーンにおける行動にも影響を与える。これらの広範な影響を包括的に考慮した上で、情報共有に関するプラットフォームのプライベートなインセンティブだけでなく、その他の利害関係者への影響も分析することができた。これらの研究成果は、すでに査読付きジャーナルに掲載および掲載確定している。また、これら以外にも、令和2年度から継続しているプロジェクトや令和3年度に新しくスタートしたプロジェクトもあるため、これらが今後査読付きジャーナルに掲載されるように努める。 加えて、シェアリングエコノミー型のプラットフォームの普及が、そこで取引される財の製造業者へ及ぼす影響に関する理論的分析にも着手することができた。これらの研究成果は、まだ論文としてまとめきれていないものからすでにワーキングペーパーとして公表したものまであるが、まだ査読付きジャーナルに掲載されるには至っていない。今後、様々な研究会・学会での報告を通して、査読付きジャーナル掲載に向けて投稿を進めていきたいと思っている。

  • プラットフォームによるビッグデータの利用が流通システムに与える影響に関する研究

    善如 悠介

    日本学術振興会, 科学研究費助成事業, 国際共同研究加速基金(国際共同研究強化(A)), 神戸大学, 2023 - 2025, Principal investigator

  • Research on Establishment of Statistics of Cashless Payment and its Impact on Economy

    FUJIWARA KENYA

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), Kobe University, Apr. 2019 - Mar. 2022, Coinvestigator

    In this project, regarding cashless payment, one of the government's KPIs (Key Performance Indicators), we ① developed various statistics and databases, and ② conducted theoretical and empirical research on the impact of cashless payment on the financial and economic system in terms of consumer behavior, impact on the store, impact on the payment platform, and impact on macroeconomic policy management. In order to evaluate the benefits and challenges of cashless society, it is important to accumulate basic statistics and data-based research.

  • 根岸 哲

    科学研究費補助金/基盤研究(A), Apr. 2017 - Mar. 2022

    Competitive research funding

  • 善如 悠介

    学術研究助成基金助成金/若手研究(B), Apr. 2016 - Mar. 2020, Principal investigator

    Competitive research funding

  • システム製品の市場における排他的契約と競争構造に関する理論的・実証的研究

    神戸大学, 特別研究員奨励費, Apr. 2012 - Mar. 2015

    Competitive research funding