Directory of Researchers
| NAKANISHI Noritsugu |  |
| Graduate School of Economics / Division of Economics | |
| Professor | |
| Business / Economics |
Researcher Profile and Settings
Affiliation
＜Faculty / Graduate School / Others＞
Graduate School of Economics / Division of Economics＜Related Faculty / Graduate School / Others＞
Faculty of Economics / Department of Economics
Teaching
- Faculty of Economics, 2022, SeminarⅡ
- Faculty of Economics, 2022, International Trade
- Faculty of Economics, 2022, International Economic Policy
- Graduate School of Economics, 2022, Seminar
- Graduate School of Economics, 2022, Research on a Special Problem in Economics
- Graduate School of Economics, 2022, Research on a Special Problem in Economics
- Graduate School of Economics, 2022, Seminar
Research Activities
Research Interests
Research Areas
Committee Memberships
- Sep. 2022 - Present, Kobe University Monograph Series, Series Editor
- Oct. 2016 - Oct. 2018, The Japan Society of International Economics, President
- Oct. 2018, The Japan Society of International Economics, Advisor
Awards
Oct. 2014 The Japan Society of International Economics, The Kojima Kiyoshi Prize of the Japan Society of International Economics, Studies on the welfare effects of piecemeal and step-wise trade liberalization and on the trade policy analyses based on the stable-set approach
受賞者は，国際経済に関する学術研究において，特に優れた業績を上げ，さらなる研究の奨励に値する者であるInternational academic award
Published Papers
- Lead, Oct. 2022, 国民経済雑誌, 226 (4), 47 - 65, JapaneseTrade liberalization and the educational/occupational choice of workers: A survey
- Lead, Jan. 2021, 国民経済雑誌, 223 (1), JapaneseReconsideration on trade frictions---Intermediate goods, offshoring, economic growth, and collateral damages
Scientific journal
- Lead, Mar. 2020, Review of International Economics, EnglishA new impetus for endogenous growth: R&D offshoring via virtual labor mobility
[Refereed]
Scientific journal
- Construction of the farsighted stable set in a class of symmetric games
すべてのプレイヤーの戦略集合が2 つの元のみを含むような「二項選択人対称ゲーム」における先見安定集合（farsighted stable set）が「規模の経済性」と呼ばれる緩やかな条件の下で存在することを証明する。さらに，先見安定集合が必ずパレート効率的な元を含むことを示す。存在証明のステップは，実際に先見安定集合を構成するためのアルゴリズムを与えている。
神戸大学経済経営学会, Apr. 2019, 国民経済雑誌, 219 (4), 39 - 49, JapaneseScientific journal
Trade in services has become an active area in the international scene of the modern economy. In addition, recent advancement of the information-communication technology (ICT) such as the Internet has brought about revolutionary changes in the ways through which international services transactions are made. In relation to this global trend, the notion of “time zone difference”
The Japan Society of International Economics, Feb. 2019, The International Economy, English[Refereed][Invited]
Scientific journal
- Cambridge University Press, Nov. 2018, Sugata Marjit & Saibal Kar (eds.), International Trade, Welfare, and the Theory of General Equilibrium, EnglishFarsightedly stable FTA structures: The roles of preexisting tariff rates
[Refereed]
Scientific journal
Time zone difference induced changes in trade and factor prices are relatively new concerns in trade literature. Here in this paper, we formulate a trade model capturing the issue of time zone difference and communication technology revolution together to show that due to these developments skilled workers benefit. Though wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers is widened under reasonable and, of course, sensible condition. Return to capital dwindles while educational capital gets relatively high return. These changes also attract educational capital from abroad and eventually alter the sectoral composition of the economy in favor of more skill based one. One interesting implication of our results points to a provocative choice problem for the country concerned regarding high wage disparity and low skill formation which itself is a question of political economy.
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG, Aug. 2018, EURASIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8 (2), 289 - 304, English[Refereed]
Scientific journal
I argue that if the notion of the ``status quo'' is not incorporated appropriately in the models of trade policy issues, there may arise some theoretical/conceptual problems in interpreting the results derived from the models as the guidance for the implementation of trade policies. To clarify the point, I use concrete examples of theoretical analyses of trade policies both in
The Japan Society of International Economics, Mar. 2017, The International Economy, 19, 23 - 37, English[Refereed][Invited]
Scientific journal
Using a specific-factors' model, with two goods (a shift-working good and a non-shift-working good), three factors (capital specific to shift-working, land specific to non-shift-working and labor) and two countries (Home and Foreign), which are located in different time zones, we highlight the impact of trade in labor services via communication networks on factor prices and production patterns. If two countries are identical in size, then under free trade in labor services, all workers work only in their local daytime, and night shift in each country is performed by imported labor services supplied by residents of the other country in their local daytime. Night-time wage becomes the same as daytime wage (a wage equalization result). Other factor prices are also equalized. In both countries, capital rental rate increases, while land rent decreases. However, if two countries are different in size, trade in labor services does not equalize wages: in the large country, wages for night-shift workers are higher than daytime wages and some residents work at night; in the small country, daytime wages become higher than night-time wages and no one works at night, and night-shift work is done by imported labor services from the large country. Land rent in the small country decreases. Land rent in the large country may or may not decrease, but it is always higher than in the small country. Capital rental rates in both countries are equalized and increase.
WILEY-BLACKWELL, Aug. 2015, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 23 (3), 638 - 662, English[Refereed]
Scientific journal
- The Keizai-Keiei Gakkai, Kobe University, Jun. 2015, Journal of Economics & Business Administration, 211 (6), 39 - 51, Japanese
Scientific journal
- The Keizai-Keiei Gakkai, Kobe University, Jun. 2013, Journal of Economics & Business Administration, 207 (6), 23 - 34, Japanese
Scientific journal
- Kobe University, 2012, Journal of Economics and Business Administration, 205 (1), 71 - 88, JapaneseThe structure of stable free trade agreements: Asymmetric 3 country model
Scientific journal
- Kobe University, Jun. 2011, Journal of Economics and Business Administration (Kokumin-Keizai-Zasshi), 第203巻 (6号), 13 - 28, JapaneseAlternative formulations of the rules on tariff consessions in the WTO and their appraisal
Scientific journal
We examine an n-player prisoners' dilemma game in which only individual deviations are allowed, while coalitional deviations (even non-binding ones) are not, and every player is assumed to be sufficiently farsighted to understand not only the direct outcome of his own deviation but also the ultimate outcome resulting from a chain of subsequent deviations by other players. We show that there exists a unique, noncooperative farsighted stable set (NFSS) and that it supports at least one (partially and/or fully) cooperative outcome, which is individually rational and Pareto-efficient. We provide a sufficient condition for full cooperation. Further, we discuss the relationship between NFSS and other "stable set" concepts such as the (myopic) von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, Harsanyi (1974)'s strictly stable set, Chwe (1994)'s largest consistent set, and the cooperative farsighted stable set examined by Suzuki and Muto (2005).
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG, Jun. 2009, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 38 (2), 249 - 261, English[Refereed]
Scientific journal
- Kobe University, Mar. 2009, 神戸大学経済経営研究所年報, 57巻, 111 - 147, JapaneseWTOにおける関税譲許ルールの役割---ゲーム理論的評価
Scientific journal
We construct a model of an international network integration formation game in which each country decides whether to join or exit from the existing international network integration and is assumed to be sufficiently farsighted to understand not only the immediate outcome of its own entry-exit but also the ultimate outcome resulting from the successive entry-exit by other countries. We demonstrate that there exists a unique farsighted stable set for this game that supports a Pareto-efficient network integration. In most cases, the worldwide network integration can be supported by the farsighted stable set. © 2009 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, International Trade and Economic Dynamics: Essays in Memory of Koji Shimomura, 161 - 185, English[Refereed]
In book
- Feb. 2008, 西島章次編「グローバリゼーションの国際経済学」, 第3章, Japanese貿易・投資自由化の政治経済学的考察
Scientific journal
- Feb. 2008, 西島章次編『グローバリゼーションと国際経済』, Japanese国際貿易・投資のメリット・デメリット
Scientific journal
- 神戸大学経済経営学会, Sep. 2007, 国民経済雑誌, 196 (3) (3), 37 - 42, Japanese
Scientific journal
We examine the long-run outcomes under free entry-exit when each firm not only takes account of the effects of her own entry-exit on the market structure but also takes full account of the effects due to other firms' simultaneous entry-exit. Adopting the framework of the theory of social situations (TOSS), we derive a unique set of stable outcomes, which is based only on two fundamental assumptions of the "firms-as-profit-maximizers" and the "free entry-exit, " but not on any specific mode of play (i.e., a specification of how the players make their decisions, take actions within the market, and think of the other players' behavior). We compare the stable outcome with the long-run equilibria under the competitive mode, the Cournot-Nash mode, and the monopolistically competitive mode. We find that (i) each of these equilibria can be compatible with the stable outcome only if the market size is small and (ii) none of them can be compatible with the stable outcome if the market size is sufficiently large Further, (iii), for almost all market size, the monopolistically competitive equilibrium is compatible with the stable outcome if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently close to (but, greater than) unity. In a sense, when the market size is sufficiently large, these three modes of play are not consistent with two fundamental assumptions. © World Scientific Publishing Company.
Jun. 2007, International Game Theory Review, 9 (2), 243 - 268, English[Refereed]
Scientific journal
- 貿易自由化ゲームにおける最小定常解の可能性
Within the framework of the theory of social situations developed by Greenberg, J. [1990], we reconsider Matsuyama's trade liberalization game (Matsuyama [1990]) played between the government of a country and a firm of an import competing industry. We first show that there exists a finite number of solutions which satisfy both the internal and the external stabilities, and that the solutions exhibit essentially the same outcomes as the subgame-perfect equilibria. Further, by replacing the internal stability with other three properties: stationarity ; minimality ; and non-empty valuedness, we show that there exists another kind of solution, which, in a sense, refines the subgame perfect equilibria and always gives rise to the socially optimal outcome.
Kwansei Gakuin University, 2007, 経済学論究, 60 (3), 83-102 (3), 83 - 102, JapaneseScientific journal
- The market selects the wrong firms in the long run
We consider the effects of free entry on the market structure and social welfare of an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Even if we allow for the existence of different types of firms initially, only one type (in almost all cases) can survive in the long run. Free entry leads an economy to a symmetric equilibrium, in which the excess entry theorem holds. Further, we consider the socially optimal policy for this economy. In cases of either (i) a concave demand (which implies strategic substitutability) or (ii) strategic complementarity (which implies a convex demand), the type of firms that should remain in the market to achieve social optimality does not necessarily coincide with the type of firms that will survive in the long run. The market may select not only the wrong number of firms but also the wrong type of firms in the long run.
BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, Nov. 2005, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 46 (4), 1143 - 1165, English[Refereed]
Scientific journal
- Kobe University, Nov. 2005, 国民経済雑誌, 192 (5), 27-36 (5), 27 - 36, Japanese
Scientific journal
- 神戸大学大学院経済学研究科 / 神戸大学経済学部, 2005, 神戸大学『経済学研究』年報, 52, 17-33, 17 - 33, Japanese
Scientific journal
- 2005, Journal of Economic Integration, 20 (4), 631-643, EnglishExpansion of network integrations: Two scenarios, trade patterns, and welfare
[Refereed]
Scientific journal
- 神戸大学経済経営学会, Feb. 2004, 国民経済雑誌, 189,2,43-53 (2), 43 - 53, Japanese
Scientific journal
- 神戸大学経済経営学会, Jan. 2003, 国民経済雑誌, 187巻1号13-25 (1), 13 - 25, Japanese
Scientific journal
- 神戸大学経済経営学会, Mar. 2002, 国民経済雑誌, 185 (3), 59-74 (3), 59 - 74, Japanese
Scientific journal
- On the existence and efficiency of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma
We show that there exist von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in a n-player version of the prisoners' dilemma game with preplay negotiations in which every player can deviate unilaterally from the currently proposed combination of actions but can not do so jointly with other players, and that every vN-M stable set includes at least one Pareto-efficient outcome. The negotiation among the players is formulated as the "individual contingent threats situation" within the framework of the theory of social situations due to Greenberg (1990). The method of proving the existence also provides us with a step-by-step method of constructing the vN-M stable set.
PHYSICA-VERLAG GMBH & CO, Dec. 2001, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 30 (2), 291 - 307, English[Refereed]
Scientific journal
- 2001, 大山道広編『国際経済理論の地平』（第４章）, Japanese国際投資政策
Scientific journal
We consider a trade liberalization game between the government of a country and a domestic firm in an import competing industry. We assume that the government and the firm can negotiate freely, openly, and costlessly, but they can not move jointly. We examine the stable outcomes under two different scenarios : one in which the players are myopic ; the other in which the players are farsighted enought to understand the final outcomes that follow sequences of negotiation between the players. In each case, we show the existence of a unique stable set. The stable set under the players' myopic behavior implies that the players stick to the "status quo"-the government does not liberalize the market and the firm does not invest. On the other hand, the stable set under the players' farsighted behavior implies the socially optimal temporal protection-the firm invests for technological improvement before liberalization and the government liberalizes the market after the firm's investment.
Kobe University, 10 Mar. 2000, The annuals of economic studies, 46, 115 - 142, Japanese- Lead, Mar. 2000, 神戸大学経済学研究年報, 46, 115 - 142, JapaneseFarsighted Stability と貿易自由化ゲーム
Research institution
We construct a simple overlapping-generations model of international trade with a durable consumption good. We show that the dynamics of the market is described by a nonlinear second-order difference equation; there exists a unique autarkic stationary equilibrium; and it is locally conditionally stable. Further we show that there exists a homothetic fictitious social utility function that characterizes the stationary equilibrium as a "tangent point" of an indifference curve and the production possibility frontier. With this, even in the presence of the consumption durability, we can easily show the basic predictions on trade patterns due to some well-known static trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model and the specific-factors model remain valid at the stationary equilibrium. In addition, we show that a country with a higher rate of time preference tends to have the comparative advantage on the durable good.
The Japan Society of International Economics, 2000, The International Economy （日本国際経済学会編『国際経済（投稿号）』）, 6, 21-38, 21 - 38, English[Refereed]
Scientific journal
- Jan. 2000, 国民経済雑誌, 181 (5), 95-114, Japaneseサンクコスト，自由参入，および整合的長期均衡
Scientific journal
- Lead, Mar. 1999, 神戸大学経済学研究年報, 45, 29 - 54, Japaneseコアと安定的な自発的交換ルール
Research institution
- 1999, Games and Economic Behavior, 27, 132 - 152, EnglishReexamination of the international export quota game through the theory of social situations
[Refereed]
Scientific journal
- Lead, 神戸大学経済経営学会, 1998, 国民経済雑誌, 177 (2), 65 - 79, Japanese
Scientific journal
- Lead, 1997, 神戸大学経済学研究年報, 44, 83 - 117, Japaneseゲーム論的貿易政策論：展望
In this paper we build a model in which an international firm, based in its home country, supplies a foreign "host" country market exclusively with its differentiated final goods partly through local production in that host country and partly through exports, and faces the problem of what combination of local production and exports is the most profitable when the host country government manipulates a local content-protection scheme as well as tariffs on the final good. Our purpose is an analysis of the effects of these two protective policies on the employment and the market share of the international firm (the sum of its local production and exports) in the host country, and a comparison of the effects of these two policies.
Lead, Kobe University, 1997, Kobe University Economic Review, 43, 53 - 71, EnglishResearch institution
- Jan. 1997, Public Policy and Ecnomic Analysis (eds. by M. Hosoe and E. Rasmusen), 79-90Welfare effects of direct entry regulations under international oligopoly
- Kobe University, Sep. 1996, Journal of economics and business administration, 174 (3), 89 - 103, Japanese
- The Japan Society of International Economics, 1996, KOKUSAI KEIZAI, 1996 (47), 136 - 138, English
- Lead, 1996, 神戸大学経済学研究年報, 43, 69 - 96, Japanese双方独占における威嚇と安定解---純粋交換モデルによる分析
Research institution
- Lead, 神戸大学経済経営学会, 1996, 国民経済雑誌, 173 (2), 55 - 68, Japanese
Scientific journal
- Lead, 1995, Kobe University Economic Review, 40, 61 - 73, EnglishToward a theory of trade negotiations
Research institution
- Lead, 1994, 神戸大学経済学研究年報, 40, 147 - 166, Japanese輸出数量規制ゲーム：新しい図解による検討
Research institution
- Lead, 神戸大学経済経営学会, 1994, 国民経済雑誌, 169 (1), 63 - 87, Japanese
Scientific journal
- Lead, 1993, 神戸大学経済学研究年報, 39, 79 - 107, Japanese輸出数量規制調整政策と経済厚生の改善
Research institution
- Lead, 1993, Journal of International Economics, 35, 377 - 387, EnglishWelfare analysis of tariff change with and without international transfers
[Refereed]
Scientific journal
- The Japan Society of International Economics, 1992, 国際経済, 1992 (43), 81 - 84, Japanese
- Lead, Kobe University, 1992, Kobe University economic review, 37, 85 - 96, EnglishOn the equivalence of tariffs and international transfer
Research institution
- Lead, 1992, 神戸大学経済学研究年報, 38, 125 - 152, Japanese段階的貿易自由化からの利益に関する理論的考察
Research institution
- The Japan Society of International Economics, 1991, 国際経済, 1991 (42), 195 - 198, Japanese
- Lead, 1991, Japanese貿易自由化と経済厚生に関する理論的研究---段階的および漸進的貿易自由化政策の意義に関連して
[Refereed]
Doctoral thesis
- Lead, 神戸大学, 1990, 六甲台論集, 37 (3), 40 - 57, Japanese国内消費税率調整政策・貿易および経済厚生---一般化されたモデルおよび継続的調整政策の安定性に関する分析
Research institution
- Lead, 1988, Japaneseサービス貿易の研究---外部効果を考慮したモデル分析
[Refereed]
Master thesis
- Lead, Kobe University, 1988, The Rokkodai ronshu, 35 (2), 25 - 37, JapaneseTheoretical Analysis on Trade in Services : with Production Externalities due to the Utilization of Information-Communication Service
Research institution
MISC
- Oct. 2017, 経済学・経営学学習のために, 平成29年度 (後期号), 39 - 47, Japanese生産可能性フロンティアが湾曲する理由
Others
- Minerva Shobo Co. Ltd., Mar. 2016, Handbook of Economics, JapaneseInternational Trade Theory
Introduction other
- 有斐閣, Mar. 2014, エコノリーガルスタディーズのすすめ：社会を見通す法学と経済学の複眼思考, Japanese経済学の基礎
Introduction commerce magazine
- 2011, Handbook of Economics, 第15章・221-237, Japanese国際貿易論
Introduction scientific journal
- 神戸大学, Apr. 2007, 経済学・経営学学習のために, 平成19年前期号, 31-39, 31 - 39, Japanese弾力性と曲線の図解
Others
- Oct. 2005, 経済学研究のために, 第9版, Japanese国際経済政策
Others
- Jul. 2005, Future（神戸大学生活協同組合の就職情報誌）, 2005年度オープンキャンパス号, Japanese自由・独立・探求---大学という時空間
Others
- Oct. 2002, 経済学研究のために, 第8版, Japanese国際経済論
Others
Books etc
- Contributor, Appendix: Elements of Economics, Springer, 2021, English, ISBN: 9789811651441Econo-Legal Studies : Thinking Through the Lenses of Economics and Law
- Joint work, Springer, Apr. 2020Virtual Trade and Comparative Advantage: The Fourth Dimension
- Single work, World Scientific, Feb. 2019, EnglishThe Essence of International Trade Theory
Textbook
- Single work, Minerva Shobo Publishing Co., Mar. 2013, JapaneseInternational Economics: International Trade
Textbook
- Single work, ミネルヴァ書房, Aug. 2010, Japanese相互依存状況における貿易政策のゲーム理論---ソーシャル・シチュエーション理論と安定集合アプローチ
Scholarly book
- Joint work, 有斐閣ブックス, Apr. 2003, Japanese国際経済理論（pp.364）
Scholarly book
- Joint work, 有斐閣, 2003, Japanese国際経済理論
Scholarly book
- Joint work, 岩波書店, 2003, Japanese国際金融・貿易辞典 （部分執筆27項目 岩本武和・阿部顕三編）
Others
- Single work, 有斐閣（発売），神戸大学研究双書刊行会（発行）, 1993, Japanese貿易自由化の理論的分析---段階的・漸進的政策と経済厚生の改善
Scholarly book
Presentations
- Webinar on Virtual Trade and Markets in a Changing World, 05 Oct. 2020, EnglishA brief history of our time zone project
[Invited]
Invited oral presentation
- China-Japan Workshop on International Economics, Mar. 2019, English, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, China, International conferenceA New Impetus for Endogenous Growth: R&D Offshoring via Virtual Labor Mobility
Oral presentation
- 第578回経済学会例会, Dec. 2018, Japanese, 神戸大学大学院経済学研究科・中会議室, We develop a simple North-South model of quality ladders to show that the virtual mobility of labor across time zones, facilitated by the advance in communication technology, can raise the endogenous growth rate of the world economy. We demonstrate that partial R\&D offshoring to the South has initially a negative effect on the level of skilled wages in the North, but this is c, Domestic conferenceA New Impetus for Endogenous Growth: R&D Offshoring via Virtual Labor Mobility
Oral presentation
- ひょうご講座, Nov. 2018, Japanese, 兵庫県民会館, Domestic conference日本の通商戦略
Public discourse
- 神戸市シルバーカレッジ国際交流・協力コース, Oct. 2018, Japanese, 神戸市シルバーカレッジ, Domestic conference貿易自由化と賃金・雇用
Public discourse
- The 2018 Annual Meeting of the APTS (Asia Pacific Trade Seminars), Jun. 2018, English, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, We develop a simple North-South model of quality ladders to show that the virtual mobility of labor across time zones, facilitated by the advance in communication technology, can raise the endogenous growth rate of the world economy. We demonstrate that partial R\&D offshoring to the South has initially a negative effect on the level of skilled wages in the North, but this is, International conferenceA New Impetus for Endogenous Growth: R&D Offshoring via Virtual Labor Mobility
Oral presentation
- VGSE Macro PhD seminar, Mar. 2018, English, The University of Vienna, We develop a simple North-South model of quality ladders to show that the virtual mobility of labor across time zones, facilitated by the advance in communication technology, can raise the endogenous growth rate of the world economy. We demonstrate that partial R\&D offshoring to the South has initially a negative effect on the level of skilled wages in the North, but this is, International conferenceA New Impetus for Endogenous Growth: R&D Offshoring via Virtual Labor Mobility
Oral presentation
- 神戸市シルバーカレッジ国際交流・協力コース, Oct. 2017, Japanese, 神戸市シルバーカレッジ, Domestic conference貿易自由化と賃金・雇用
Public discourse
- 日本国際経済学会第76回全国大会, Oct. 2017, Japanese, 日本大学, Trade in services has become an active area in the international scene of the modern economy. In addition, recent advancement of the information-communication technology (ICT) such as the Internet has brought about revolutionary changes in the ways through which international services transactions are made. In relation to this global trend, the notion of ``time zone differenc, Domestic conferenceThe Presidential Address---Studies on Time Zones and International Trade: An Introductory Overview
Public discourse
- International Economics Seminar, Jul. 2016, Japanese, Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, We develop a monopolistically competitive international trade model in which (i) each rm can produce multiple varieties of the differentiated good and, taking account of the \economies of scope," it chooses the range of the varieties that it produces; (ii) confronting the cost of choice, each consumer decides how many varieties they consume; (iii) the equilibrium range of the v, Domestic conferenceEndogenous Determination of Optimal Choice of Product Scope for Multiproduct Firms and Trade Liberalization
Oral presentation
- 50 years of Simple General Equilibrium Models and Policy Implications in Open Developing Economies---Historical and Emerging Issues, Nov. 2015, English, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, India, International conferenceFarsightedly stable FTA structures
[Invited]
Invited oral presentation
- McGill Seminar, Oct. 2013, English, McGill University, Canada, International conferenceTime Zones and International Trade: An Overview
Oral presentation
- 経済学会例会, Jun. 2013, Japanese, Kobe University, Domestic conferenceTime Zones and International Trade: An Overview
Oral presentation
- Kobe Macroeconomics Study Group Meeting, Mar. 2013, Japanese, Ohita University, Domestic conferenceTime Zones and International Trade: An Overview
Invited oral presentation
- 日本国際経済学会第71回全国大会, Oct. 2012, Japanese, 日本国際経済学会, 神戸,日本, Domestic conferenceFarsightedly Stable FTA Structures
Oral presentation
- Public Economic Theory 12 (PET12), Jun. 2012, English, Association for Public Economic Theory, Taipei, Taiwan, International conferenceFarsightedly Stable FTA Structures
Oral presentation
- Modern Economics Study Group, Nov. 2011, Japanese, 東北大学, 仙台市, Domestic conferenceFarsightedly stable FTA structures
Oral presentation
- Japan Society of International Economics, Kansai Chapter Seminar, Jul. 2011, Japanese, 日本国際経済学会, 大阪市, Domestic conferenceFarsightedly stable FTA structures
Oral presentation
- The 6th Pan-Pacific Conference on Game Theory, Feb. 2011, English, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan, International conferenceStable FTA structure---An application of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in international trade
Oral presentation
- Asia Pacific Trade Seminars 2008, Jul. 2008, English, Sydney University, International conferenceFisheries negotiations---A game-theoretical consideration on the difference in the negotiation procedures
Oral presentation
- 京都大学経済研究所ミクロセミナー, May 2008, Japanese, 京都大学経済研究所, Domestic conferenceConstructive proof of existence and characterization of the farsighted stable set in a price-leadership cartel model under the optimal pricing policy
Oral presentation
- McGill-CIREQ Seminar, Sep. 2007, English, McGill University, International conferenceFarsighted stablity of price-leadership cartel with endogenous pricing
Oral presentation
- 2006 Kobe Summer Seminar for Half-light Idea of Game Theory, Sep. 2006, Japanese, スペース・アルファ（神戸市北区）, Domestic conferenceThe roles of the WTO rules on tariff concession: An extended application of the theory of social situations
Invited oral presentation
- 11th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, Dec. 2004, English, 未記入, Ventana Canyon Resort, Tucson, USA, International conferenceFree entry, market size, and the optimistic stability
Others
- 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference, Mar. 2004, English, 未記入, Lisbon(Hotel Altis), International conferenceTwo scenarios of expansion of network integrations
Others
- International Conference on Internatijonal Trade and Factor Mobility, Jul. 2003, English, 未記入, 関西大学, International conferenceExpansion of network integrations: Two scenarios, trade patters, and welfare
Others
- 2002 Kobe Summer Seminar for Half-light Idea of Game Theory, Sep. 2002, Japanese, スペース・アルファ（神戸市北区）, Domestic conferenceFarsighted stabilities and the marriage problem
Oral presentation
- Mini Conference on International Economics, Jul. 2002, English, 関西大学, International conferenceA dynamic specific-factors model of production with the indivisibility in investment activities
Oral presentation
- 日本国際経済学会50周年記念大会, Oct. 2000, English, 一橋大学, International conferenceThe roles of rules on tariff concessions in the WTO: A game-theoretical appraisal
Oral presentation
Association Memberships
Canadian Economic Association
International Society of Dynamic Games
International Economics and Finance Society (IEFS), Japan
Japanese Economic Association
The Japan Society of International Economics
Research Projects
- 日本学術振興会, 科学研究費助成事業 基盤研究(B), 基盤研究(B), 神戸大学, 01 Apr. 2022 - 31 Mar. 2027タスク貿易と男女格差---教育選択・人的資本蓄積及び家庭内生産の経済成長への含意
- 科学研究費補助金／基盤研究(A), Apr. 2016 - Mar. 2021, Principal investigator
Competitive research funding
- 科学研究費補助金／基盤研究(A), 2010, Principal investigator
Competitive research funding
- 2006新しい日本型経済パラダイムの研究教育拠点
Competitive research funding
- 科学研究費補助金／基盤研究(C), 2006, Principal investigator
Competitive research funding
- 2005新しい日本型経済パラダイムの研究教育拠点
Competitive research funding