NAKANISHI Noritsugu | |
Graduate School of Economics / Division of Economics | |
Professor | |
Business / Economics |
Oct. 2014 The Japan Society of International Economics, The Kojima Kiyoshi Prize of the Japan Society of International Economics, Studies on the welfare effects of piecemeal and step-wise trade liberalization and on the trade policy analyses based on the stable-set approach
受賞者は,国際経済に関する学術研究において,特に優れた業績を上げ,さらなる研究の奨励に値する者であるInternational academic award
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すべてのプレイヤーの戦略集合が2 つの元のみを含むような「二項選択人対称ゲーム」における先見安定集合(farsighted stable set)が「規模の経済性」と呼ばれる緩やかな条件の下で存在することを証明する。さらに,先見安定集合が必ずパレート効率的な元を含むことを示す。存在証明のステップは,実際に先見安定集合を構成するためのアルゴリズムを与えている。
神戸大学経済経営学会, Apr. 2019, 国民経済雑誌, 219 (4), 39 - 49, JapaneseScientific journal
Trade in services has become an active area in the international scene of the modern economy. In addition, recent advancement of the information-communication technology (ICT) such as the Internet has brought about revolutionary changes in the ways through which international services transactions are made. In relation to this global trend, the notion of “time zone difference”
The Japan Society of International Economics, Feb. 2019, The International Economy, English[Refereed][Invited]
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Time zone difference induced changes in trade and factor prices are relatively new concerns in trade literature. Here in this paper, we formulate a trade model capturing the issue of time zone difference and communication technology revolution together to show that due to these developments skilled workers benefit. Though wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers is widened under reasonable and, of course, sensible condition. Return to capital dwindles while educational capital gets relatively high return. These changes also attract educational capital from abroad and eventually alter the sectoral composition of the economy in favor of more skill based one. One interesting implication of our results points to a provocative choice problem for the country concerned regarding high wage disparity and low skill formation which itself is a question of political economy.
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG, Aug. 2018, EURASIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8 (2), 289 - 304, English[Refereed]
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I argue that if the notion of the ``status quo'' is not incorporated appropriately in the models of trade policy issues, there may arise some theoretical/conceptual problems in interpreting the results derived from the models as the guidance for the implementation of trade policies. To clarify the point, I use concrete examples of theoretical analyses of trade policies both in
The Japan Society of International Economics, Mar. 2017, The International Economy, 19, 23 - 37, English[Refereed][Invited]
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Using a specific-factors' model, with two goods (a shift-working good and a non-shift-working good), three factors (capital specific to shift-working, land specific to non-shift-working and labor) and two countries (Home and Foreign), which are located in different time zones, we highlight the impact of trade in labor services via communication networks on factor prices and production patterns. If two countries are identical in size, then under free trade in labor services, all workers work only in their local daytime, and night shift in each country is performed by imported labor services supplied by residents of the other country in their local daytime. Night-time wage becomes the same as daytime wage (a wage equalization result). Other factor prices are also equalized. In both countries, capital rental rate increases, while land rent decreases. However, if two countries are different in size, trade in labor services does not equalize wages: in the large country, wages for night-shift workers are higher than daytime wages and some residents work at night; in the small country, daytime wages become higher than night-time wages and no one works at night, and night-shift work is done by imported labor services from the large country. Land rent in the small country decreases. Land rent in the large country may or may not decrease, but it is always higher than in the small country. Capital rental rates in both countries are equalized and increase.
WILEY-BLACKWELL, Aug. 2015, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 23 (3), 638 - 662, English[Refereed]
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We examine an n-player prisoners' dilemma game in which only individual deviations are allowed, while coalitional deviations (even non-binding ones) are not, and every player is assumed to be sufficiently farsighted to understand not only the direct outcome of his own deviation but also the ultimate outcome resulting from a chain of subsequent deviations by other players. We show that there exists a unique, noncooperative farsighted stable set (NFSS) and that it supports at least one (partially and/or fully) cooperative outcome, which is individually rational and Pareto-efficient. We provide a sufficient condition for full cooperation. Further, we discuss the relationship between NFSS and other "stable set" concepts such as the (myopic) von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, Harsanyi (1974)'s strictly stable set, Chwe (1994)'s largest consistent set, and the cooperative farsighted stable set examined by Suzuki and Muto (2005).
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG, Jun. 2009, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 38 (2), 249 - 261, English[Refereed]
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We construct a model of an international network integration formation game in which each country decides whether to join or exit from the existing international network integration and is assumed to be sufficiently farsighted to understand not only the immediate outcome of its own entry-exit but also the ultimate outcome resulting from the successive entry-exit by other countries. We demonstrate that there exists a unique farsighted stable set for this game that supports a Pareto-efficient network integration. In most cases, the worldwide network integration can be supported by the farsighted stable set. © 2009 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, International Trade and Economic Dynamics: Essays in Memory of Koji Shimomura, 161 - 185, English[Refereed]
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We examine the long-run outcomes under free entry-exit when each firm not only takes account of the effects of her own entry-exit on the market structure but also takes full account of the effects due to other firms' simultaneous entry-exit. Adopting the framework of the theory of social situations (TOSS), we derive a unique set of stable outcomes, which is based only on two fundamental assumptions of the "firms-as-profit-maximizers" and the "free entry-exit, " but not on any specific mode of play (i.e., a specification of how the players make their decisions, take actions within the market, and think of the other players' behavior). We compare the stable outcome with the long-run equilibria under the competitive mode, the Cournot-Nash mode, and the monopolistically competitive mode. We find that (i) each of these equilibria can be compatible with the stable outcome only if the market size is small and (ii) none of them can be compatible with the stable outcome if the market size is sufficiently large Further, (iii), for almost all market size, the monopolistically competitive equilibrium is compatible with the stable outcome if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently close to (but, greater than) unity. In a sense, when the market size is sufficiently large, these three modes of play are not consistent with two fundamental assumptions. © World Scientific Publishing Company.
Jun. 2007, International Game Theory Review, 9 (2), 243 - 268, English[Refereed]
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Within the framework of the theory of social situations developed by Greenberg, J. [1990], we reconsider Matsuyama's trade liberalization game (Matsuyama [1990]) played between the government of a country and a firm of an import competing industry. We first show that there exists a finite number of solutions which satisfy both the internal and the external stabilities, and that the solutions exhibit essentially the same outcomes as the subgame-perfect equilibria. Further, by replacing the internal stability with other three properties: stationarity ; minimality ; and non-empty valuedness, we show that there exists another kind of solution, which, in a sense, refines the subgame perfect equilibria and always gives rise to the socially optimal outcome.
Kwansei Gakuin University, 2007, 経済学論究, 60 (3), 83-102 (3), 83 - 102, JapaneseScientific journal
We consider the effects of free entry on the market structure and social welfare of an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Even if we allow for the existence of different types of firms initially, only one type (in almost all cases) can survive in the long run. Free entry leads an economy to a symmetric equilibrium, in which the excess entry theorem holds. Further, we consider the socially optimal policy for this economy. In cases of either (i) a concave demand (which implies strategic substitutability) or (ii) strategic complementarity (which implies a convex demand), the type of firms that should remain in the market to achieve social optimality does not necessarily coincide with the type of firms that will survive in the long run. The market may select not only the wrong number of firms but also the wrong type of firms in the long run.
BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, Nov. 2005, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 46 (4), 1143 - 1165, English[Refereed]
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We show that there exist von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in a n-player version of the prisoners' dilemma game with preplay negotiations in which every player can deviate unilaterally from the currently proposed combination of actions but can not do so jointly with other players, and that every vN-M stable set includes at least one Pareto-efficient outcome. The negotiation among the players is formulated as the "individual contingent threats situation" within the framework of the theory of social situations due to Greenberg (1990). The method of proving the existence also provides us with a step-by-step method of constructing the vN-M stable set.
PHYSICA-VERLAG GMBH & CO, Dec. 2001, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 30 (2), 291 - 307, English[Refereed]
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We consider a trade liberalization game between the government of a country and a domestic firm in an import competing industry. We assume that the government and the firm can negotiate freely, openly, and costlessly, but they can not move jointly. We examine the stable outcomes under two different scenarios : one in which the players are myopic ; the other in which the players are farsighted enought to understand the final outcomes that follow sequences of negotiation between the players. In each case, we show the existence of a unique stable set. The stable set under the players' myopic behavior implies that the players stick to the "status quo"-the government does not liberalize the market and the firm does not invest. On the other hand, the stable set under the players' farsighted behavior implies the socially optimal temporal protection-the firm invests for technological improvement before liberalization and the government liberalizes the market after the firm's investment.
Kobe University, 10 Mar. 2000, The annuals of economic studies, 46, 115 - 142, JapaneseResearch institution
We construct a simple overlapping-generations model of international trade with a durable consumption good. We show that the dynamics of the market is described by a nonlinear second-order difference equation; there exists a unique autarkic stationary equilibrium; and it is locally conditionally stable. Further we show that there exists a homothetic fictitious social utility function that characterizes the stationary equilibrium as a "tangent point" of an indifference curve and the production possibility frontier. With this, even in the presence of the consumption durability, we can easily show the basic predictions on trade patterns due to some well-known static trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model and the specific-factors model remain valid at the stationary equilibrium. In addition, we show that a country with a higher rate of time preference tends to have the comparative advantage on the durable good.
The Japan Society of International Economics, 2000, The International Economy (日本国際経済学会編『国際経済(投稿号)』), 6, 21-38, 21 - 38, English[Refereed]
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In this paper we build a model in which an international firm, based in its home country, supplies a foreign "host" country market exclusively with its differentiated final goods partly through local production in that host country and partly through exports, and faces the problem of what combination of local production and exports is the most profitable when the host country government manipulates a local content-protection scheme as well as tariffs on the final good. Our purpose is an analysis of the effects of these two protective policies on the employment and the market share of the international firm (the sum of its local production and exports) in the host country, and a comparison of the effects of these two policies.
Lead, Kobe University, 1997, Kobe University Economic Review, 43, 53 - 71, EnglishResearch institution
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